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Strategic Theory and Xi Jinping’s Taiwan Test
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King’s College London and the National University of Singapore
Abstract
Whether or not Xi Jinping will pursue reunification with Taiwan presents a serious challenge for
scholars and policy practitioners alike. But is reunification still an option, or is Xi’s pursuit of this
steadfast goal of the Communist Party too little, too late? This paper will utilise strategic
theory—a set of purposive assumptions delineated in the work of Thomas Schelling—to examine
how the concepts, resources, and objectives of Chinese strategy toward Taiwan align with the
objective of reunification. Building on the notion of a “limited war” in the contemporary cross-
Strait relationship, this paper acknowledges Beijing’s ability for heavy-handed military
punishment of a Taiwan that seeks independence, but focuses instead on how Beijing has utilised
available strategic tools to increase the risk of all-out war. This paper will argue that it is Beijing’s
ability (or inability) to manipulate perceptions of risk that impact progress toward the objective
of reunification. The paper begins with an overview of strategic theory, and its core assumptions
and critiques, before elucidating four elements of strategic tradition in the cross-Strait
relationship: legal, political, geoeconomic, and military. It then evaluates, both individually and
collectively, the efficacy of each instrument within Chinese strategy toward Taiwan.
Keywords: cross-Strait relations, Xi Jinping, Chinese strategy, strategic theory.
In the Beijing-Taipei relationship, the more things change, the more they stay
the same. After Xi Jinping met Ma Ying-jeou in Singapore in November 2015,
there was hope for a new era in cross-Strait relations and cooperation. However,
little progress has emerged since; and, particularly since the Democratic
Progressive Party and Tsai Ing-wen took office in May 2016, there has been a
marked cool in the relationship. Taking this context as but a starting point, there
are many questions emerging from a close examination of the cross-Strait
relationship: why progress is gradual, why the status quo (or its variants)
persists, and why reunification has not materialised. From such questions
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springs the puzzle at the core of this paper: how is Xi’s strategy toward Taiwan
striving to attain the objective of reunification, and why has it been unsuccessful?
To answer this question, this paper will put forth a more comprehensive and
nuanced understanding of what Chinese strategy toward Taiwan is. Different
from countless existing assessments of Chinese policy toward Taiwan, a
strategic focus involves digging into the interaction between ways, ends, and
means developed and pursued by Beijing. To do so, as will be discussed below,
this paper will rely on strategic theory as pioneered in the works of Thomas
Schelling and his protégés to develop analytical and empirical rigour. As the only
piece of research to utilise this method vis-à-vis cross-Strait relations, this
framework serves as the basis for tracing elements of a Chinese strategic
tradition while accounting for the role of interdependence, commitments and
threats, mixed-motive bargaining processes, and the potential for conflict in the
Taiwan Strait. The discussion herein examines China’s Taiwan strategy in the
context of a “limited war”—a situation in which Beijing, despite its ability to
militarily punish Taiwan, has largely chosen to pursue its political objectives
through other, less kinetic tools of statecraft. Through the use of strategic
theory as an analytical lens, this paper offers utility to both scholars and
practitioners in tracing and analysing the efficacy of Chinese strategy.
Strategic Theory: An Analytical Method for Strategic Problems
Nearly seventy years ago, Bernard Brodie called for a “genuine analytical
method” to use in approaching strategic problems (1949: 484). One such
method is that of strategic theory, an analytical tool for examining the
interaction between ways, means, and ends which “opens the mind to all the
possibilities and forces at play,” thereby prompting scholars and practitioners
alike “to consider the costs and risks of [their] decisions and weigh the
consequences of those of [their] adversaries, allies, and others” (Yarger, 2006:
2). The application of strategic theory enables the researcher to gather and
analyse empirical evidence of how strategy is developed and implemented,
what effects emerge, and what policy outcomes and implications arise. It
extends beyond the realm of pure military strategy to find middle ground
between a historical approach of analysis and the rigidity of theoretical
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frameworks. While neither a “checklist” nor a “cookbook solution”, what
strategic theory ultimately offers is a way to understand how an actor defines,
articulates, and employs strategy toward an opponent (Yarger, 2006: vii). To
make such an understanding operational, strategic analysis herein relies upon
process tracing, or the “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected
and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the
investigator” (Collier, 2011: 823). Within this narrative, it is the examination and
analysis of values shaping Beijing’s selection and ability to apply instruments
from its strategic toolkit that will enable an analysis of Chinese strategy toward
Taiwan.
One of the main assumptions in strategic theory is that war is used
deliberately by political actors to achieve political objectives. In Clausewitzian
logic, war as a political instrument is strategically (and intentionally) focused on
the objective of dealing a single debilitating attack to destroy the enemy.1 But
the reason strategic theory tends to focus on conflict can be seen in the very
essence of how the concept of strategy has evolved. British soldier and military
theorist B.H. Liddell Hart defined strategy as “the art of distributing and
employing military means to fulfil the ends of policy” (2008: 126), what Stone
has further repackaged as the “instrumental link between military means and
political ends” (2011: 4). Both definitions—among countless others—take a
Clausewitzian approach by placing a clear emphasis upon the military
responsibility to attain policy objectives (Elkus, 2014; Howard, 1983).
Strategy in today’s globalised, networked space is a far more complex
creature, encompassing all available instruments of policy and statecraft in
thinking beyond conflict to the subsequent peace (Freedman, 2013: 136).
Building upon Clausewitzian thought but moving beyond pure military strategy,
the work of strategic theory seeks to explain and investigate situations wherein
actors are “endeavouring to secure their interests … against the interests of
other political actors” (Smith & Stone, 2011: 29-30). Such endeavours are
increasingly characterised by the absence of kinetic war; instead, a “new species”
1 This logic is captured in the oft-cited excerpt from On War: “… war is not merely an act of policy
but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other
means. … The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never
be considered in isolation from their purpose” (Howard & Paret, 1989: 87).
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of war and “competition in risk-taking” has emerged (Schelling, 2008: 94). This
contest of force—known better as a “limited war”—best captures the
contemporary cross-Strait relationship given Beijing’s ability for heavy-handed
military punishment rather than the actual application of force across the Strait
(Schelling, 2008). 2 As will be discussed below, the objective from Beijing’s
perspective is less to use kinetic force to achieve a political outcome than to
utilise the increased risk of all-out war as a means of extracting greater
concessions—or at minimum, decreasing recalcitrance—from Taipei regarding
the task of reunification.
Core Premises Guiding Strategic Analysis
The premises of strategic theory, while remaining Clausewitzian in nature, have
evolved to offer a coherent framework for investigating situations where actors
are striving to secure their interests against those of other actors through a
strategic increase in the fear or risk of war. Of these premises, there are three
dominant themes of relevance to conducting strategic analysis of the cross-
Strait relationship. First, as a theory of interdependent decision-making beset
with the unknowns of a particular strategic environment, each actor exercises a
degree of control over what the other wants (Smith & Stone, 2011: 29-30). The
best course of action is dependent upon the other actor; the actors serve to
benefit from compromise, exchange, and/or collaboration rather than
inflexibility or dissociation. Strategic analysis thus becomes an endeavour of
investigating the structure of incentives, information, communication, available
choices, and employable tactics—the exogenous factors shaping a course of
action—available to all parties in a specific situation. The focus of strategic
analysis becomes the situations, rather than the actors who are assumed to be
rational and capable of relating “means to ends as efficiently as possible”
(Lopez-Alvez, 1989: 204).
2 It is worth reminding ourselves of the difference between limited war, as in the Taiwan Strait,
and actual war as can be seen in US-led coalitions across the Middle East in the post-9/11 era.
The latter includes the use of overt military force, the actual firing of shots, and thus no longer
involves the risk or potential of a “general war” between parties (Schelling, 1980: 191-192).
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A second theme from the literature on strategic theory is the ongoing “game”
of tacit and explicit bargaining inherent in international politics. Actors must be
alert to what the other actor is expressing through chosen manoeuvres, and
able to convey intentions and awareness of expectations—expectations which,
in turn, set limits upon the risk of conflict (Schelling, 1980: 101). Throughout this
game of bargaining, an actor’s choice to rely upon kinetic or non-kinetic tools
contributes to a dynamic process of mutual accommodation which retains the
safety net of the status quo ante at which the bargaining process began. Actions
can alter the game through incurring costs, increasing risk, or even by reducing
the range of subsequent choices.
Such actions are aided by the third theme, namely the skilled application of
commitments, threats, and promises. Each must be calibrated to reflect
expectations of interdependence, requiring an understanding of the beliefs,
values, and interests maintained by the opponent, as well as knowledge “about
[one’s] environment and the constraints on what [one] may choose” (Schelling,
1984: ix), which is necessary to match means with ends.3 The challenge for
actors, however, is both maintaining sufficient resolve and the flexibility to
decouple from threats or promises. Cheap words alone will prove insufficient in
backing down—for if verbiage alone was adequate to undo an actor’s
commitment, threat, or promise, then it was arguably a tactic of little value from
the outset.
Taken in sum, the concept of limited war as emerging from the study of
strategic theory involves interdependent decision-making, bargaining, and a
mixture of threats, promises, and/or commitments. A limited war, such as can
be seen in the Taiwan Strait, will be no less political in nature; yet, it will fall
short of an absolute form of conflict given the constraints of tangible and
intangible resources, colloquially known as the ways and means of strategy.
Such a conceptualisation is, of course, not without its critics. Of greatest
relevance is scholarship on strategic culture, which suggests different
approaches to issues of war and peace due to unique cultural and/or historical
backgrounds. Beginning first with work on Soviet strategic culture, this
approach has since been re-applied time and again around the world (Snyder,
3 This entails an attention to cultural elements, existing behaviours and tactics, historical
experience, ideological platforms, and/or an awareness to sources of motivation.
6 Lauren Dickey
1977; Johnston, 1995; Booth & Trood, 1999; Echevarria, 2011). Chinese
strategic culture is predominantly framed in terms of traditional military and
defensive thought, often citing Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, Sun Tzu and other
ancient scholars for their various contributions to contemporary Chinese
strategy, be it interpersonal behaviours, the role of “non-offence”, or the
importance of deception (Li, 1997; Sawyer, 2007; Kaufman & Mackenzie, 2009).
Other framings of strategic culture tend to gravitate toward Han ethnocentrism,
or a Chinese set of interests divergent from those of other rising powers (Pye,
1992; Johnson, 2009). Still others orient understandings of strategy within
traditional theories of international relations—drawing upon the record of
Chinese military texts and historical actions in mixing Confucian-Mencian
paradigms with classical realism or realpolitik (Ford, 2016; Johnston, 1995;
Scobell, 2009).
Unfortunately, all such approaches under the guise of “strategic culture” are
highly problematic—and, at the cost of focusing on cultural variables thought to
shape strategy, fail to constitute assertions of what strategy is. If these so-called
Chinese-specific concepts are stripped of their affiliations to Chinese culture, it
is hard to find anything remotely just Chinese about them. After all, Sun Tzu,
Machiavelli, and Clausewitz in different eras and geographies each stress the
value of knowledge and deception, of bloodless victory, and of non-military
methods to victory (Porter, 2007). Put simply, strategic culture is a logically and
empirically problematic perspective on strategy that avoids analytical precision
(Gray, 2014: 93-95). Rather than focusing on the ambiguities of defining culture
and contriving correlation between cultural by-products and strategic
behaviour, strategic theory engages with elements of traditional international
relations theory while analysing the linkage between ideas, resources, and
objectives.
The Evolution of China’s Strategic Tradition toward Taiwan
What strategic theory is poised to offer is an exacting method laden with
purposeful assumptions for examining the logic of Chinese leadership in its
manipulation of strategy to wage a limited war vis-à-vis Taiwan. Despite such
analytical rigours, no scholars have explicitly employed this lens to cross-Strait
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relations, opting for traditional realist, liberal, or constructivist frameworks
instead. Entirely absent is scholarship that comprehensively ties the core
premises of strategic theory to the contemporary cross-Strait relationship, and
a focus on strategy and the policy themes it has translated into under Xi, rather
than the policy guidance upon which Chinese strategy toward Taiwan is built.
The remaining text seeks to fill this gap, offering an illustration and analysis of
the comprehensive elements of strategic power employed by Beijing with the
intention of increasing the risks—both perceived and actual—to Taiwan should
it continue to impede (or deny) Beijing the ultimate objective of reunification.
Beijing’s leaders are predisposed to reunify, a task that Xi himself has said
cannot be passed on from generation to generation (Blanchard, 2013). Chinese
leadership continues to pursue the long-held and widely touted goal of peaceful
reunification in the form of “one country, two systems”, despite changes to the
strategic environment since 1949 (Tsang, 2016). On the opposite side of the
Strait, a status quo of neither independence nor unification is the baseline from
which Kuomintang or Democratic Progressive Party politicians shape their
agenda.
Despite these divergent strategic trajectories, it is China’s long sought goal of
reunification and interest in not “losing” Taiwan that perpetuates its strategy
toward the island. Of the tools available, there are four instruments in the
Chinese strategic tradition that have consistently been applied in ties between
Beijing and Taipei. In particular, there are the principles that have guided
Beijing’s views about sovereignty over Taiwan (the legal instrument), the CCP’s
mandate as executed by political leadership (the political instrument), the
military strategy that has determined Chinese decisions on how to enforce
sovereignty claims (the military instrument), and the strategic economic
linkages across the Strait (the geoeconomic instrument). By focusing on these
four instruments in China’s strategic tradition toward Taiwan, this research can
schematically analyse the evolution of themes within Chinese strategy that bear
upon its progress toward national reunification. These concepts—and the policy
themes they have translated into—can be understood as the foundation for Xi’s
own strategy toward Taiwan.
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While each will be evaluated separately to maximise analytical depth, each
instrument operates in close conjunction with other elements of Beijing’s
strategy. Collectively, the instruments offer a way of looking at Beijing’s
management of the Taiwan issue as a type of limited—and ongoing—war. For
Xi, and his predecessors, these four instruments are intentionally manipulated
below a threshold of overt military conflict to support the political objective of
unifying the Chinese state. This synergy of ways, means, and ends forms part of
an organic whole, known as strategy, and demarcates both progress and
efficacy in attaining China’s goal of reunification.
Legal Instrument: One Sovereign China (Not Two)
In the contemporary period, Chinese strategy encompasses a long tradition of
interpreting and advancing legal norms which serve Beijing’s political objectives.
This can be seen across time and strategic environments, ranging from China’s
ascension to the United Nations, the International Court of Justice’s opinion on
Kosovo’s independence, and UN peacekeeping operations in Macedonia, to
issues on the Chinese periphery such as the reversion of Hong Kong and Macau,
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, and—of concern herein—
the Taiwan issue.4
The concept of sovereignty alone has merited tomes of rigorous scholarship
(e.g., Krasner, 1999; deLisle, 2002; Chan, 2015). While beyond the scope of this
article, it is worth noting that sovereignty as conceptualised in the Western,
Westphalian sense was not native to China (Tok, 2013: 24). Instead, it entered
China during the period of unequal treaties made between foreign powers and
the Qing dynasty; it was subsequently adapted in conjunction with traditional
4 In each instance, Chinese government officials have argued on behalf of a vision of sovereignty
that best suits Chinese interests. In discussions with US officials surrounding the PRC’s ascension
to the UN, for instance, “dual representation” was nixed for its invalidation of Chinese
sovereignty (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971). At the ICJ, Kosovo’s
unilateral declaration of independence was denounced by China on the premise that a part
cannot retrospectively seek to be free from the whole (International Court of Justice, 2009).
Sovereignty along the Chinese periphery has been largely based on history, be it legacies of the
Hundred Years of Humiliation (i.e., Hong Kong/Macau) or historical access and use of the
disputed territories (i.e., Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and South China Sea features).
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notions of suzerainty manifested in the Chinese governing concept of tianxia天
下 (“all under heaven”). At the intersection of Westphalian and “Eastphalian”
norms, sovereignty in the Chinese sense of the term is less about the hard
boundaries of a state, falling instead between the power of governance and the
right of a core sovereign power to claim territorial integrity (Coleman &
Maogoto, 2013; Brown, 2016; Zheng, 2016). It is this concept that Beijing
employs, both domestically and internationally, to assert its “one China” policy
or principle and to entice or punish others in their support or hindrance of
Beijing’s political objective of reunification. More specifically, it is this
perception of sovereignty that has enabled Beijing to weaken international legal
norms on sovereignty—insofar as its claims to Taiwan go unchallenged—and
exert greater strategic influence over Taiwan.
Beijing’s use of the instrument of sovereignty in strategy toward Taiwan
manifests in several forms, each of which is underpinned by an insistence, based
upon United Nations Resolution 2758 (October 1971), that the PRC is the sole
representative of China. Perhaps of greatest prominence is the impact “one
China” has upon Taiwan’s international space, be it relations with diplomatic
partners or participation in international organisations and non-governmental
activities. More recently, the squeeze play to pressure an acceptance of “one
China” sans different interpretations has trickled down to the level of Taiwanese
citizens.5 This section will focus specifically on Taiwan and the UN, diplomatic
partnerships, and Taiwanese abroad with the intention of highlighting how such
tactics are thought to support progress toward reunification through a
prevention of Taiwanese secession.
From 1993-2008, Taiwanese government officials actively lobbied their
partners and allies to support bids for a place in the UN.6 Realising such efforts
had yet to bear fruit, Ma Ying-jeou shifted to pursuing meaningful inclusion in
UN-affiliated institutions and other international bodies (UN General Assembly,
5 The author’s qualification of Chinese pressure is based upon data from the Taiwanese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs which examines how China undermines relations with Taiwan’s diplomatic
partners, prevents the development of substantive relationships, blocks participation in
international organisations, suppresses NGO activities, undermines overseas Chinese work,
and/or impedes civil society (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2016).
6 E.g., UN General Assembly (1998).
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2008). It was, in many ways, a strategy that won appeasement from Beijing.
Where Taiwan was willing to take a different name—usually “Chinese Taipei”—
Beijing did not feel it was losing recognition of its de jure sovereignty as “one
China” at the international level. Instances where Taiwan could be construed as
a separate entity (à la “one China, one Taiwan”) were, expectedly, met with
resistance. In 2016 alone, Taiwanese delegations were forced to leave an
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meeting in
Brussels, a UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Committee on Fisheries
conference in Rome, and denied an invitation to the International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) due to Chinese advocacy for restricting participation to
government officials or an insistence on upholding Resolution 2758 (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2016).
Regarding Taiwan’s diplomatic ties, in the Chen Shui-bian era of 2000-2008,
nine of Taiwan’s partners severed ties with Taipei to recognise Beijing. 7 A
divisive issue often accompanied by geoeconomic carrots to incentivise
normalisation of relations with the PRC, in one instance a prime minister was
ousted amid a brief establishment of diplomatic ties with Taiwan (BBC News,
2004). The era of “chequebook diplomacy” ended with Ma Ying-jeou’s unilateral
declaration in 2008, giving way to a largely stable period in Taiwan’s foreign
relations (Focus Taiwan News, 2015). Despite the guilty plea of former
Guatemalan president Alfonso Portillo to charges of accepting bribes in
exchange for diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, it was only Gambia that severed
ties with Taiwan during the Ma era (Villegas, 2014). Since Tsai Ing-wen took
office in May 2016, not only has Gambia re-established relations with Beijing,
but Taiwan has also lost its diplomatic links with São Tomé and Príncipe, and
Panama. Additional pressure from the Nigerian government to relocate the
existing Taiwan Trade Mission suggests the Chinese government is insisting that
other countries ensure relations remain well within the bounds of Beijing’s
interpretation of sovereign control and “one China” (Bax et al., 2017).
Arguably most troubling of all, Beijing’s averment of sovereignty has trickled
down to the level of Taiwanese citizens. Taiwanese tourists in New York, for
instance, are barred from visiting the UN headquarters. Sometime after May 19,
7 The countries which switched recognition: Macedonia, Liberia, Dominica, Vanuatu, Grenada,
Senegal, Chad, Malawi, and Costa Rica.
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2016, the United Nations switched its requirements for accessing the UN
buildings from possessing “government-issued photo identification” to
“government-issued photo identification issued by a Member state or an
Observer State [emphasis added]”.8 Elsewhere, “one China” has determined the
fate of suspected Taiwanese telecommunications fraudsters arrested overseas
and deported to mainland China (not Taiwan) despite the existence of a cross-
Strait crime fighting agreement. As of early 2017, with over 220 deported
Taiwanese still in China, it is easy to succumb to a narrative that Beijing is using
the deportations to punish the Tsai Ing-wen administration. But reality is likely
far more nuanced; each of the countries that have sent the Taiwanese to
mainland China have followed the accepted norm of deportation whereby
criminals are sent back to their city of embarkation. In many of these
countries—Kenya, Cambodia, and Malaysia in particular—the governments
stand to benefit economically from the continuation of a stable relationship
with Beijing, thus increasing the likelihood of an aversion to actions against the
“one China” policy. Ultimately, however, the deportation of Taiwanese
criminals may simply be about justice: Beijing seeks more stringent punishment
for actions that have claimed the bank accounts of countless Chinese citizens.
From both cases, while a smoking gun is likely to remain beyond reach, it
remains no less plausible that China was the culprit in creating the necessary
pressures to bring the suspects to the mainland irrespective of their passports
(Chung, 2016; Glaser, 2016; Huang, 2016a).
Aside from Taiwanese protestations, Beijing’s proclamations of sovereignty
have largely gone unchallenged. Those that have advocated for an
interpretation of “one China” which differs from Beijing’s have been
threatened—literally—by the silencing of microphones or the expulsion from
meetings (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), 2016). While
this tactic rarely operates alone, it has been effective insofar as countries
continue to complicity accept and uphold China’s definition of “one China”, sans
separate interpretations, and avoid strategic decisions that would suggest a
8 See internet archives of the United Nations Visitor Centre Tickets webpage
(http://visit.un.org/content/tickets). It is worth noting that, as of July 2017, while Taiwanese
tourists can proffer “valid identity documents” to visit the UN Geneva Palais des Nations, the
author’s sources have suggested that Taiwanese traveling in a private capacity are still denied
entry regardless of documentation.
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recognition otherwise. Sovereignty, in short, is a central element of strategy
which enables China to play both softball and hardball. Beijing can opt to
accommodate Taiwan’s requests at the international level—as, usually,
“Chinese Taipei”—when no threat to Beijing’s de jure sovereign power exists;
but, when Taiwan is seen to be seeking greater independence or a “two Chinas”
world, Beijing will continue to squeeze Taiwan’s ability to act, de facto, as a state.
Political Instrument: The Party’s Mandate and Taiwan
It has become fashionable to debate how and whether statesmen shape policy.
On one hand are those that argue in favour of statesmen, positing that
international relations cannot be understood if the role of the individual is
overlooked (Byman & Pollack, 2001: 145). A statesman-centric analysis in
China—and, indeed it would be a statesman not stateswoman—would examine
his rise through the Party ranks, personal background, and personality as
underpinning strategy and policy.9 On the other hand are those that believe
statesmen do not inherently matter, and that the impact of political leadership
is a result of weighing opportunities and risks, rather than skill and expertise
(Breuning, 2007: 32-36; Allison & Zelikow, 1999: 16-21). This is not too dissimilar
from a rational actor model in suggesting that Chinese leadership weighs pros
and cons in decision-making but may exercise proclivities toward certain
behaviours given how its leaders have been socialised to view the world.
Chinese strategy toward Taiwan—a core national interest—has traditionally
been spearheaded by the highest echelons of political power. But while the
statesman is of explicit interest, such a task is made more difficult by the black
box and secretive operations of Zhongnanhai that characterise Chinese
decision-making circles. Fortunately, the task is less to discern how a leader has
risen to power, or how he manipulates collective versus centralised leadership,
and instead to examine the interaction between the leader and the political
system. Contemporary Chinese leaders are privileged in their ability to control
and operationalise ideology and political objectives; for the Taiwan issue, this
9 No woman has ever risen beyond the Politburo to the highest echelons of political power.
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entails a “popularised awareness” of how leaders think about management of
the cross-Strait relationship (Brady, 2015: 804; Brown, 2012a: 53).
To be certain, the priority given to Taiwan by generations of Chinese
leadership has depended much on perceptions of the Taiwan issue, namely
whether Taiwanese politicians are seen to encourage greater Taiwanese
independence or seek closer cooperation across the Strait. Consistent across
both time and generations of Chinese political leadership, however, is a
grounding in the Party’s political mandate. Readily seen in the government work
reports issued at annual lianghui 两会 meetings as representative of political
consensus within the Party, each leader is explicitly tasked with the long-term
objective of sustaining the right of China’s one-party system to govern a unified
Chinese nation (Heath, 2014: 129).
Taking this existential political mandate as a core mission—and building on
political capital in the form of a leader’s loyalty to the Party—has ultimately
restricted the options available to Chinese leaders in shaping strategy toward
Taiwan. Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin adamantly advocated on behalf of the
task of reunification in their respective issuance of “six items” (liutiao六条) and
“eight points” (badian 八点).10 For both, and arguably continuing to present-
day Beijing, the Taiwan issue is fundamentally an ideological one. Accompanying
the obvious divide in political systems is that of competing national identities
and nationalisms (Cole, 2017). In seeking to address the ideological gap, Deng
and Jiang focused their efforts upon the path toward reunification in a manner
that was mindful of the respective lifestyles and political systems emerging on
each side.
Hu Jintao, by contrast, was much softer on Taiwan. While vocalising an
immovability from the one-China principle and the necessity of progressing
toward peaceful reunification, Beijing’s strategic stance was far more subdued
under Hu than in past eras (Li, 2016). Readily attributed by some experts to a
lack of supportive political allies—as Hu himself was a protégé of Deng
Xiaoping—Taiwan instead became a high priority for Hu’s deputy, Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao (Brown, 2012b). In a 2004 speech with the overseas
10 See Xinhua (2004) and Renmin ribao (1995).
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Chinese community at the PRC Embassy in London, Wen expressed a need to
“earnestly consider” (renzhen kaolü认真考虑) enacting a unification law (BBC
Chinese, 2004; Paal, 2016). Wen’s idea was ultimately inverted and formalised
as the Anti-Secession Law of 2005, a notable development which suggests
Beijing’s political objective at the time recognised the difficulties in reunifying,
thus shifting to focus on preventing secession and separatism. In other words,
it was a law that responded to perceived changes in Beijing’s strategic
environment, but set a future precedent for the use of military force as a
response to a Taiwanese declaration of independence (Huang, 2016b).
Xi Jinping has returned to a decisively hawkish posture on the Taiwan issue,
emphasising that a final resolution cannot wait forever (Blanchard, 2013). While
the gap in ideologies on both sides of the Taiwan Strait is no less prominent now
than sixty years ago, of greater concern is the issue of sovereignty and the
existence of one de jure, sovereign China. Working within the political mandate
of the 18th Party Congress to “build a moderately prosperous society … and
achieve the renewal of the Chinese nation” (Xinhua, 2012), Xi’s Taiwan strategy
will be successful if he can ensure a single-mindedness to uphold “one China”
exists on both sides of the Strait.
The Party will continue to retain a preeminent place in Xi’s strategy toward
Taiwan. Narratives or perspectives which run counter to the Party’s political
objectives vis-à-vis Taipei will intentionally be restricted. What one will see in
public messaging, particularly from the central government and Party apparatus,
is a firm commitment to prevent Taiwanese independence with secondary calls
to complete the “great task” (daye大业) of reunification (Glaser, 2016; Huang,
2016b; Zheng, 2016). This is best seen in the non-negotiable one China
principle—the notion that the “two sides belong to one China” (liang’an
tongshu yige Zhongguo两岸同属一个中国)—which serves as the foundation
upon which cross-Strait relations are conducted.11 Just as Xi cannot ignore the
Party’s mandate and support China’s national rejuvenation, so too can he not
back down or ease the political pressures Beijing has strategically—and
11 The one China principle should not be confused with the one China policy, a widely-accepted
recognition by other countries of Beijing’s stance that it is the sole legitimate representative of
China, including Taiwan.
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intentionally—imposed upon Taiwan as prerequisites for navigating the cross-
Strait relationship.
Military Instrument: Waging War by Other Means
Mao Zedong famously pronounced that political power grows out of the barrel
of a gun; and in China, it is the Communist Party that commands the gun. The
role of the military instrument in Beijing’s strategic tradition toward Taiwan is
shaped by strategic concepts, doctrine, and capabilities and the reality that the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a loyal servant of the Party and its General
Secretary, not the Chinese state or the Chinese people. It is the interests and
involvement of the PLA that have defined the oscillation between pacifism and
realism in a deterrence strategy that has yet to yield a final resolution of the
Taiwan issue.
The ability to deter through military might is complemented by the
comparatively softer tactics of compellence manifested in the PLA’s political
work efforts toward Taiwan—a quasi-schizophrenic tradition that has emerged
in Beijing’s use of the military instrument. Deterrence (weishe 威慑) in the
Chinese mind effectively combines Thomas Schelling’s oft-referenced
definitions of deterrence and compellence (Cheng, 2011: 92; Kissinger, 2012:
133). Taken in combination, the two tactics offer Beijing a means for deterring
Taiwan from any steps that would alter its sovereign status as a part of China,
and compelling the island slowly toward the goal of reunification. The same
combination of tactics target the United States, which Beijing seeks to keep
from supporting Taipei through the development of military capabilities or
involvement in a future cross-Strait contingency (Chan, 2004).
The military component of Beijing’s strategy toward Taiwan cannot be
separated from domestic politics and the demands upon the PLA as the armed
wing of the Communist Party. While the PLA’s mission set has broadened amid
modernisation, a responsibility for handling the Taiwan issue will always remain
the PLA’s “sacred responsibility”—a reality unlikely to change as long as
reunification and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the CCP’s dominant
priority (Information Office of the State Council, 2004). Given the pace of PLA
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modernisation, it is tempting to believe that the Chinese military has long since
achieved preponderance over Taiwan. The emergence of advanced, disruptive
technology—including short-range missiles, fifth-generation fighters, and
nuclear-powered attack submarines—presents a persuasive security dilemma
narrative across the Strait. As Beijing’s security and military capabilities continue
to increase, many Taiwanese see their own increased vulnerability and
inadequate defences (Chang, 2016).
But high tech platforms alone do not translate into an ability to fight and win
wars. Underpinning the warfighting performance of today’s PLA are the
doctrines and exercises that offer a sense of how leadership in Beijing envisions
a future cross-Strait conflict. The PLA’s ability to prepare for such a conflict is
determined primarily by guidance from the Central Military Commission (CMC).
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the CMC has issued three iterations of
strategic guidelines (zhanlüe fangzhen 战略方针 ) to shape the principles,
development, and application of Chinese military power (Zheng, 2016). The
guidelines have evolved from Mao-era People’s War to “active defence” and a
prioritisation of “winning informationised [networked] local wars”, a reflection
of the development of institutional and operational capacities to pursue and
protect Beijing’s strategic objectives (Finkelstein, 2007: 71).
However, while the existence of strategic guidelines illuminates how the PLA
thinks about military readiness and preparation, it offers little for understanding
the actual capabilities of today’s PLA. Absent a “Grenada-like scenario” that
offers analysts a sense of how adept the PLA is at joint operations and warfare,
much will continue to remain unknown about the application of military force
in the Taiwan Strait (Cheng, 2016). What is clear, however, is that the PLA’s
procurement and training on disruptive platforms serves as an essential
deterrent—a tactic that allows Beijing to manage the threshold at which conflict
would break out in the Strait, and the limits in which such conflict could be
constrained.
As mentioned above, the other element of Chinese deterrence is a far subtler
form of compellence. In 2003, the Central Military Commission declared
political work as an essential task of the PLA, including a responsibility to
conduct campaigns of public opinion warfare (yulun zhan舆论战), psychological
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(xinli zhan 心理战 ), and legal warfare (falü zhan 法律战 ) (CPC News, 5
December 2013; Wu & Liu, 2014). Collectively known as the “Three Warfares”
(san zhan三战), these campaigns seek to degrade Beijing’s opponent—Taipei—
in gradual efforts to create perceptions favourable to China’s strategic
objectives (Zhang, 2006: 212). The military instrument is of particular utility
toward Taiwan insofar as the PLA can use its people, platforms, and exercises to
strengthen Taiwanese perception of China’s military strength and weaken its
will to fight. This can be seen, for instance, in the increasingly hawkish rhetoric
of retired PLA officers. While not representative of the entire military apparatus,
commentary that likens Taiwan to “a fish swimming at the bottom of a pot”
(fudi youyu釜底游鱼) is widely disseminated across Chinese news outlets and
social media, strengthening a sense of national confidence and resolve in
pursuing Beijing’s reunification agenda (Dai, 2016). Periodic exchanges between
retired PLA officers and their Taiwanese counterparts takes a slightly different
tack to easing tensions, fostering common interests, and nurturing ties to bind
the Strait closer together (e.g., Taipei Times, 12 November 2016b). The greatest
threat, however, lies in the psychological impact of Chinese military might: the
omnipresent threat of 1,000 missiles capable of raining down on Taiwan or the
joint training exercises which showcase an ability to launch an amphibious
attack and island invasion (Nanfang ribao, 17 September 2012; US Department
of Defence, 2016: 109).
The military instrument in contemporary Chinese strategy toward Taiwan is
far more than the application of overt military force. Aware of the
accompanying costs, Beijing has shifted instead to rely upon the PLA as part of
a calibrated political warfare campaign. It has succeeded in deterring Taiwan
from further steps toward independence—and, in many ways, deterring the US
from any actions that would strengthen its commitment to Taiwan beyond the
Taiwan Relations Act.12 Looking toward the future, the task for Beijing entails
integrating modern weapons with a leaner, meaner professional fighting force
that is capable and competent in manipulating risk without creating an all-out
war.
12 Under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), the United States is committed to, for instance,
providing Taiwan with arms of a defensive character. Involvement in a cross-Strait contingency
is intentionally vague.
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Geoeconomic Instrument: The Power of Beijing’s Purse Strings
The breakneck economic growth of the last several decades has left China well
positioned to turn to its wallet, rather than its weaponry, in pursuit of strategic
objectives. Geoeconomic tools—the intentional use of economic instruments in
pursuit of geopolitical ends—are more than just trade for trade’s sake in
Chinese strategy toward Taiwan, enabling Beijing to focus on consolidating its
own economic strength as a means of projecting power and influencing (as
opposed to coercing) Taiwan toward reunification (Norris, 2016).
Beijing’s geoeconomic strategy toward Taiwan has, over the years, reflected
several immediate and long-term priorities. First, and not too dissimilar from
ensuring the PLA’s own modernisation serves developmental goals, is the need
to bolster China’s domestic economic growth and modernisation. Nowhere are
these interests clearer than in Xi’s focus on reaching “two centennials”:
becoming a moderately well-off society (xiaokang shehui小康社会) by 2020,
around the Party’s centennial, and a fully developed socialist nation
(shehuizhuyi xiandaihua guojia社会主义现代化国家) by 2050, to coincide with
the centennial of the PRC’s founding (Xi, 2014). The paramount importance of
reunification is, notably, something for which leadership in Beijing may be
willing to risk economic development (Li, 2016). A second priority of Beijing’s
geoeconomic strategy toward Taiwan can be seen in its ability to use economic
levers to woo other countries away from supporting or recognising Taiwan
through the “one China policy” discussed above. Third, geoeconomic tools are
used by Beijing in a strategic carrot-and-stick combination, exploiting Taiwan’s
need to liberalise to stay competitive, avoid marginalisation, and maintain
access to Chinese markets and the global supply chain (Chen, 2013: 406).
Under Xi, after Tsai failed to explicitly accept the 1992 Consensus in her
inaugural address, Chinese leadership sought to increase pressure upon the
Taiwanese tourism industry—a source of vulnerability for a sector that has
fundamentally restructured itself around the demand of Chinese tourists (Da
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jiyuan, 2015; Blanchard & Hung, 2016).13 Known colloquially as yi tiao long一
条龙 (or “one dragon”), the Taiwanese tourism sector began to receive
mainland tourists en masse from 2002. Travel agencies attract Chinese group
tours with at-cost or low-cost fees and attempt to turn a profit by taking the
groups to hotels, restaurants, and shops to accrue commission (Taipei Times, 13
September 2016a). Money spent on the island does not go directly into
Taiwanese pockets, however, as an increasing number of tourist services are
owned by Hong Kong and Chinese investors.
Given the problematic structure of Taiwan’s China-oriented tourism sector,
the island is particularly vulnerable to the ebbs and flows of tourist numbers.
Those businesses designed to take advantage of the growth in Chinese tourist
groups are first to suffer when numbers decline.14 Initially, it appeared that
China’s tourism quotas were slow to take effect. Chinese tourist agencies were
directed by the central government to decrease the availability of Taiwan travel
permits; websites froze offerings of Taiwan packaged tours (Glaser, 2016). But
the reality—as seen in data on “tourist categories 1-3” from Taiwan’s National
Immigration Agency (NIA) in table 1 below—is that group tourism to Taiwan
began to decline from 2013.15 This shift can be attributed to a series of factors,
including less favourable exchange rates, slower Chinese economic growth, the
ease of traveling to Taiwan independently, and/or the desire to travel elsewhere
in the world.16 Somewhat more perplexingly, even as group tourists began to
decline, individual travel began a steady increase through 2015—suggesting
that more Chinese were finding their way to Taiwan via Hong Kong or other
transit points. At the end of 2016, with Beijing’s travel quotas in place, total
Chinese entries have declined 20 percent year-on-year, a not insignificant
13 In 2016, tourism directly and indirectly contributed five percent (US$26.6 billion) of Taiwan’s
total gross domestic product (GDP) and approximately 669,500 jobs, or roughly 5.9 percent of
total employment (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2017).
14 Given the focus on the mainland Chinese tourist market, the ability of travel agencies to
attract tourists from elsewhere in the region has atrophied.
15 Author compilation of National Immigration Agency, Taiwan (ROC) December 2016 Statistics,
available at: www.immigration.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=1325434&ctNode=29699&mp=1
(accessed 1.21.2017).
16 For example, the Renminbi-New Taiwan Dollar exchange rate has seen a gradual decline since
mid-2015; Chinese tourist numbers to the US, Australia/New Zealand, and Great Britain have
continued a steady climb since 2001.
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number but one that suggests the bite to Chinese geoeconomic damage is not
yet as bad as the bark.17
Table 1: Chinese Travel to Taiwan
What emerges from the priorities delineated through Beijing’s use of the
geoeconomic instrument toward Taiwan—as seen in the case of the tourism
sector—is an interaction between power and interdependence that utilises
Taiwan’s vulnerabilities to punish actions which are seen by Beijing as counter
to its political agenda (Keohane & Nye, 2012: 7-10). Going forward, if the 1992
Consensus is explicitly accepted by Tsai, one could expect the “carrot” of full
17 According to November 2016 data from the Tourism Bureau (ROC), the total number of
visitors to Taiwan declined year-on-year by 5.14 percent. While mainland Chinese tourists
dipped in number, visitors from Japan, the United States, Southeast Asia, Australia/New
Zealand, Europe, Korea and elsewhere increased (Tourism Bureau, November 2016).
Year Tourist categories
1-3
Individual travel Total Chinese entries
2001 - - 26,669
2002 2,151 - 41,846
2003 12,768 - 39,427
2004 19,150 - 29,016
2005 54,162 - 102,737
2006 98,548 - 181,994
2007 81,903 - 182,777
2008 90,035 - 177,344
2009 601,754 - 858,698
2010 1,188,929 - 1,588,876
2011 1,286,574 30,281 1,748,940
2012 2,001,941 191,148 2,667,298
2013 2,263,476 522,443 3,266,113
2014 2,141,727 1,186,497 3,869,655
2015 2,001,105 1,334,818 3,925,464
2016 1,427,452 1,308,601 3,107,689
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tourist outflows to be resumed. Until such circumstances materialise, the
structure of Taiwan’s tourism industry and dependency upon mainland tourists
will continue to expose the island to Beijing’s geoeconomic manipulation.
Conclusion
Contemporary Chinese strategy toward Taiwan takes a nuanced, multi-faceted
approach that has shifted from a primary focus on securing reunification to
preventing independence. An examination of the four elements of Beijing’s
strategic tradition—legal, political, military, and geoeconomic—highlights the
reality that the decisions Chinese leaders make on the Taiwan issue often have
strong historical precedents. But this should, by no means, suggest that there is
a one-size-fits-all approach for Xi to modify and apply to the cross-Strait political
separation. Nor should such analysis suggest that, given the absence of
reunification, Beijing should embark on a military invasion and occupation to
solve the Taiwan problem once and for all. Rather, what is clear from the
analysis of each instrument of the Chinese strategic tradition is just how much
each instrument depends on the success of the others to shape strategy capable
of attaining Beijing’s political objectives.
Returning to the research question—how Xi’s strategy is striving to attain the
objective of reunification and why it has been unsuccessful—the task of this
article has been an explicit examination of the interaction between ways, means,
and ends. It has sought to assess how an actor—China—defines, articulates, and
employs strategy toward Taiwan. Through the application and manipulation of
four instruments of statecraft, Beijing has succeeded in maintaining a threshold
in its relations with Taipei just below the level of overt conflict. The existence of
a “limited war”, as Schelling and strategic theorists would so deem, creates
several disadvantages (and few advantages) in the overall thrust of China’s
strategy toward Taiwan.
While Beijing’s preponderance of comprehensive national power appears to
give it an upper hand in bargaining with Taipei, the legal and political tools are
far too constrained to allow for much room to bargain. A conceptualisation of
sovereignty confined to “one China” on Beijing’s terms will preclude anything
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short of Taiwan’s eventual unification. In the political sphere, a Chinese leader
will simply be unable to abandon the narrative of Taiwan’s inseparable place in
Chinese territory without shaking the entire foundation of the Party’s political
authority. Similarly, promises and threats to exact military or geoeconomic
punishment upon Taiwan cannot be rescinded by Beijing without incurring
political costs and a loss of legitimacy.
As one looks toward the future, where Chinese strategy has and will continue
to fall short is in its ability to adapt to the interdependencies of cross-Strait
relations. Xi and his predecessors have resolutely conveyed Beijing’s intentions
and expectations of their counterparts in Taiwan; but none have displayed
adequate receptivity to Taiwanese strategic signalling. What appears to be
strategy is but a one-way conversation with a stronger China setting the terms
and conditions. Absent a flexible, sophisticated strategy, what will remain of
China’s approach to Taiwan is a series of policy initiatives—encapsulated in the
four tools studied herein—that will continue to deter Taiwanese independence,
deny Taiwan status as a de facto state, and incentivise closer cross-Strait
cooperation as a path to reunification. Above all, China’s strategic approach to
Taiwan will continue to remain ambiguous, operating in a zone of limited war,
shy of overt conflict but susceptible to Beijing’s abilities to ratchet up or dial
down pressures in a manner that best suits its political objectives.
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